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Abstract—Recently, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also
known as drones, has emerged as an efficient and cost-effective
solution for package delivery. Especially, drones are expected
to incur lower cost, and achieve fast and environment friendly
delivery. While most of existing drone research concentrates on
surveillance applications, few works studied the drone package
delivery planning problem. Even so, the previous works only
focus on the drone delivery planning of a single supplier. In
this paper, thus we propose the supplier cooperation in drone
delivery (CoDD) framework. The framework considers jointly
package assignment, supplier cooperation, and cost management.
The objective of the framework is to help suppliers minimize and
achieve fair share of the cost as well as reach a stable cooperation.
The trade-off between using drones and outsourcing package
delivery to a carrier is also investigated. The performance
evaluation of the CoDD framework is conducted by using the
Solomon benchmark suite and a real Singapore dataset which
evidently confirms the practical findings.
Index Terms—UAV, Drone delivery, Routing, Supplier Coop-
eration, Coalition
I. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of drones has been increasing rapidly in
many fields [1] including surveillance, entertainment, and
wireless communications. The drone technology has been
improved significantly in terms of travel reliability, efficiency,
and energy/fuel consumption. Therefore, drones are regarded
as a promising solution for package delivery [2]. Many big
businesses, e.g., Amazon and DHL, have used drones to
deliver packages and merchandise items to their customers.
However, drones may not be an optimal choice in many
situations, and suppliers need to evaluate many factors for
drone delivery. In particular, while a drone usually offers faster
delivery, lower cost, less manpower, and more environment
friendly than a ground-based vehicle, i.e., truck, the drone
has certain constraints such as flying distance limit per trip
and small delivery capacity. The flying distance limit and
the location of a supplier’s depot are therefore the important
parameters affecting a serving area of the drone delivery. For
example, if customers are located outside the serving area,
the supplier cannot use a drone for package delivery of the
customers. Similarly, drones cannot carry a heavy package.
Therefore, suppliers need to seek for an alternative delivery
mode, i.e., by outsourcing the delivery of some packages to
a carrier. The cost of outsourcing the package delivery to
a carrier is usually higher than that of the drone delivery.
This tradeoff needs to be optimized to minimize the cost
and maximize the profit of the supplier. Moreover, multiple
suppliers can cooperate and create a pool of suppliers. The
cooperative suppliers share not only drones, but also depots
and customers to serve. As such, the pool of drones can extend
the drone serving area of one supplier. This can significantly
reduce the delivery cost and improve their resource utilization.
According to the aforementioned scenario, suppliers have
to address the associated challenges, i.e., (i) should suppliers
cooperate and create a pool of drones or not, (ii) if the pool
is created, how the suppliers fairly share the delivery cost
incurred from the cooperation, (iii) to minimize the delivery
cost, which customers should be served by which drone and
which customers should be assigned to a carrier, and (iv) how
many drones are needed and what is the routing path of each
drone? To tackle these four challenges, we propose the supplier
cooperation in drone delivery (CoDD) framework. The objec-
tive of the CoDD framework is to help the rational suppliers
make the best decisions in terms of minimial cost and stability.
The proposed CoDD framework has three decision-making
components, i.e., supplier cooperation, cost management, and
package assignment. In the supplier cooperation, we adopt
the merge-and-split algorithm [3] to decide on a coalition
structure among suppliers. In the cost management component,
the Shapley value [4] is applied to fairly distribute the incurred
cost. In the package assignment, we propose a mix integer
programming problem to optimize the trade-off between using
drones and outsourcing package delivery to a carrier as well
as to decide the routing paths of the drones. Furthermore, the
performance evaluation of the CoDD framework is conducted
by using two datasets, i.e., the Solomon benchmark suite
and a real data from a Singapore logistics company. Some
important findings are indicated from the numerical study.
For example, the number of customers inside the serving area
directly influences the cooperation decisions of the suppliers.
II. RELATED WORK
Package delivery and vehicle routing problem has caught
high attention from researchers for many years [5]. Thanks
to the recent technology innovation, a drone can be used
for a variety of applications with acceptable reliability while
incurring much cheaper cost than before. The authors in [6]
studied a drone delivery problem aiming to minimize the total
requirement of drone resources, i.e., fuel or battery. In this
work, drones are allowed to visit multiple depots to refuel or
charge their battery. The authors in [7] proposed a delivery
planning for a drone and a truck. Since the drone has a
limited capacity, the truck serves the customers with a heavy
package. They proposed two optimization problems, which
are formulated as a mix integer programming. The difference
of these problems is that a drone can depart and land at (i)
only the original depot and (ii) any customer location that the
truck visited, where the truck acts as a mobile depot for the
drone. They solved the optimization problems by a heuristic
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
06
80
3v
2 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  1
5 A
ug
 20
18
Supplier Cooperation
Merge & Split Algorithm
Package Assignment
Optimization (MIP)
Cost Management
Shapley Value
Cost
Sharing
Optimal
Solution
Coalitional
Structure
Fig. 1: The supplier cooperation in CoDD framework.
algorithms. The authors in [2] considered only drones in the
delivery. The factors incorporated in the planning include
capacity, battery weight, changing payload weight, and reusing
vehicles to reduce costs. They proposed two multi-trip drone
routing problems, which have different objectives, i.e., (i) to
minimize the cost subject to delivery time constraint and (ii)
to minimize the time subject to the budget cost constraint.
They used simulate annealing (SA) heuristic algorithm to
find an optimal solution. The authors in [8] proposed the
mathematical formulations for closed form estimations to
address the joint truck and drone delivery problem. They used
K-mean algorithm to find launch locations and adopted the
genetic algorithm to solve the vehicle routing problem.
Although there are some studies of the drone delivery, none
of them considers the delivery planning for multiple suppliers.
Especially, when package assignment, suppliers cooperation,
and cost management are optimized jointly. Therefore, this is
the focus of this paper.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider multiple suppliers using drones to deliver
packages to their customers. Specifically, the suppliers have
two delivery options, i.e., to use their drone or outsource
the package delivery to a carrier. Therefore, the suppliers
determine which packages to be delivered using the drone
or carrier with different associated costs. The suppliers can
cooperate and establish a pool of suppliers that can be shared
for the package delivery. For example, among the cooperative
suppliers, a package of a customer of one supplier can be
delivered by a drone belonging to the different supplier. In the
following, we describe the CoDD framework, the components
of which are shown in Figure 1.
A. Package Assignment
The supplier has to decide on which drone to deliver which
package, i.e., package assignment. The detail of package as-
signment is described as follows. Let N = {p1, p2, . . . , p|N |}
be a set of all suppliers, where |N | is the total number of
suppliers. A supplier p ∈ N has one depot. Cp and Dp
denote the set of customers and the set of drones of supplier p,
respectively. Two or more suppliers can cooperate and form a
coalition. Let P be a set of suppliers in the same cooperation,
i.e., coalition P ⊆ N . When suppliers cooperate, the suppliers
will share their customers to serve and their drones which are
referred to as a pool. For example, when suppliers p1, p2, and
p3 cooperate, the set of the customers in the pool is denoted as
C = C1 ∪C2 ∪C3. Similarly, the set of the drones in the pool
is denoted as D = D1∪D2∪D3. Here, C = {c1, c2, . . . , c|C|}
and D = {d1, d2, . . . , d|D|} are the sets of customers and
drones in the pool, where |C| and |D| are the total numbers
of the customers and the drones in the pool, respectively. We
use matrix O to represent which customer belongs to which
supplier, and the element of the matrix denoted by oi,p is a
binary parameter. oi,p = 1 indicates that customer i belongs
to supplier p, and oi,p = 0 otherwise. Every customer in C
has a package to be delivered. The package of customer i
has specific weight, which is denoted as ai. A package is
allowed to be transferred from one depot to another depot of
cooperative supplier p ∈ P in the same pool to facilitate the
drone delivery. To deliver a package of the customer, a drone
must depart from the depot, which the package is located, and
then come back to any depot of supplier p ∈ P . Every drone d
has its limits, i.e., daily flying distance limit ld, flying distance
limit per trip ed, capacity limit fd, and working hour limit hd.
Note that the flying distance limit per trip defines the serving
area. Every drone d has an average flying speed, which is
denoted as sd. The flying distance from location i to location
j is denoted as ki,j .
There are four costs involved in the package assignment
including (i) the initial cost of a drone Ĉd, such as rental fee,
preparation cost, and manpower, (ii) routing cost C¯i,j , which
is incurred from traveling such as fuel or energy cost, (iii)
the transferring cost C¨p, which is incurred when one supplier
ships or picks up packages from other suppliers in the same
pool, and (iv) outsourcing cost C`i paid to a carrier.
B. Supplier Cooperation
The supplier has to decide whether or not to cooperate with
other suppliers. Given the set of all suppliers N , a certain
supplier chooses to cooperate with other suppliers by forming
a coalition denoted as a set P . Let Φ = {P1,P2, . . . ,P|Φ|}
denote a coalition structure, where |Φ| is the total number of
coalitions in the coalition structure. The coalition structure is
basically a set of all coalitions that include all the suppliers,
i.e., N = P1 ∪ P2 ∪ · · · ∪ P|Φ|. To illustrate, given N =
{p1, p2, p3, p4} and Φ = {{p1, p2}, {p3, p4}}, this coalition
structure consists of two coalitions, i.e., P1 = {p1, p2} and
P2 = {p3, p4}, where the supplier p1 cooperates with the
supplier p2 and the supplier p3 cooperates with the supplier
p4. Note that the total number of possible coalition structures
can be calculated by the Bell number [4] based on |N |.
C. Cost Management
After the suppliers cooperate, it is important to achieve a
fair share of cost incurred among the suppliers in the same
pool, i.e., the cost management. Let V (P) denote the delivery
cost incurred from coalition P . Let vi(P) denote the cost that
supplier i needs to pay for the delivery when joining coalition
P . Therefore,∑i∈P vi(P) = V (P). We use the Shapely value
as the solution of the cost management. The Shapley value [4]
is expressed as follows:
vi(P) =
∑
S⊆P\{i}
|S|!(|P| − |S| − 1)!
|P|! (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)) ,
where |S| denotes the total number of suppliers in set S, and
|P| denotes the number of suppliers in P .
IV. OPTIMIZATION FORMULATION
In this section, we present the optimization problem of the
package assignment, which is formulated as a mix integer
programming. The objective is to minimize the total delivery
cost as stated in the Section III-A. The objective function and
the constraints are defined in (1), and (2) to (16), respectively.
The optimization problem has six binary decision variables.
• Wd indicates whether the initial cost of drone d needs to be paid
or not. If the payment is required, i.e., the drone will be used in
the delivery, then Wd = 1, and Wd = 0 otherwise.
• Yi,d,p,q is an allocation binary variable of drone d. Yi,d,p,q = 1 if
drone d departs from the depot of supplier p to serve customer i
and continues traveling to the depot of supplier q, and Yi,d,p,q = 0
otherwise.
• Zi indicates whether customer i will be served by an outsourcing
carrier or not. If Zi = 1, the package of customer i is outsourced
to the carrier, and Zi = 0 otherwise.
• Mi,p,q is a transferring binary variable. Mi,p,q = 1 if the package
of customer i needs to be transferred from the depot of supplier p
to the depot of supplier q.
• Tp indicates whether the transferring cost needs to be paid or
not. If Tp = 1, the supplier p transfers its packages or picks up
the packages of other suppliers in the same pool, and Tp = 0
otherwise. Note that the transferring cost is not paid by for an
individual supplier. It is included in the delivery cost of the pool.
• Bp,d is an auxiliary variable for eliminating impractical route.
Bp,d = 1 if drone d departs from the depot of supplier p to serve
a customer and comes back to the same depot.
Minimize:∑
d∈D
ĈdWd +
∑
i∈C,d∈D,p,q∈P
(
C¯p,i + C¯i,q
)
Yi,d,p,q +
∑
p∈P
C¨pTp +
∑
i∈C
C`iZi (1)
subject to (2) to (16).∑
i∈C,p∈P,q∈P
Yi,d,p,q ≤ ∆Wd, ∀d ∈ D (2)∑
d∈D,p∈P,q∈P
Yi,d,p,q + Zi = 1, ∀i ∈ C (3)∑
i∈C,p∈P
Yi,d,p,q =
∑
i∈C,p∈P
Yi,d,q,p, ∀q ∈ P, d ∈ D (4)∑
i∈C
Yi,d,p,p ≤ ∆Bp,d, ∀d ∈ D, p ∈ P (5)
Bp,d
(∑
r∈P
Br,d − 1
)
≤
∑
i∈C,q∈P,p 6=q
∆Yi,d,p,q, ∀d ∈ D, p ∈ P (6)∑
p∈P,q∈P
aiYi,d,p,q ≤ fd, ∀i ∈ C, d ∈ D (7)∑
q∈P
Yi,d,p,q (kp,i + ki,q) ≤ ed, ∀i ∈ C, d ∈ D, p ∈ P (8)∑
ı∈Cq∈P
Yi,d,p,q (kp,i + ki,q) ≤ ld, ∀d ∈ D, p ∈ P (9)
The constraint in (2) ensures that if packages are assigned
to a drone, the initial cost of the drone must be paid, where
∆ denotes a large number. The constraint in (3) ensures that
every package must be served either by a drone or a carrier.
The constraint in (4) ensures that each drone has the same
number of times for departing and landing at any depots. The
constraints in (5) and (6) ensure that an impractical route does
not exist. An example of impractical route is when a drone is
assigned to serve packages from two different depots, but the
drone never flies from one depot to another.
The constraints in (7) to (10) control flying limits of the
drone delivery. The constraint in (7) ensures that a package,
which is assigned to a drone, does not exceed the capacity
limit. The constraints in (8) and (9) ensure that the flying
distance does not exceed the limit per trip and the limit per
day, respectively. The constraint in (10) ensures that the total
delivery time does not exceed the limit (e.g., 8 hours). Here,
traveling time and serving time are taken into account in the
constraint. Note that ti is the serving time of customer i.
The constraint in (11) ensures that if there is no package
transferring between depots, the drone must depart from the
original depot. If the package of customer i is transferred to
a new depot, the drone must depart from the new depot in
order to serve customer i as imposed by the constraint in (12).
The constraints in (13) and (14) ensure that a package is not
transferred to multiple depots or the origin depot, respectively.
The constraints in (15) and (16) ensure that the transferring
cost is paid when a supplier sends or picks up packages from
the pool. Note that, in the CoDD system, a drone can visit up
to three depots.∑
i,p,q
(
ki,p + ki,q
sd
+ ti
)
Yi,d,p,q ≤ hd, ∀i ∈ C (10)
oi,p −
∑
q∈P
Mi,p,q ≤ ∆
∑
d∈D,q∈P
Yi,d,p,q ∀i ∈ C, p ∈ P (11)
Mi,p,q ≤ ∆
∑
d∈D,r∈P
Yi,d,q,r, ∀i ∈ C, p, q ∈ P (12)∑
q∈P
Mi,p,q ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ C, p ∈ P (13)
Mi,p,p = 0, ∀i ∈ C, p ∈ P (14)∑
i∈C,q∈P
Mi,p,q ≤ ∆Tp, ∀p ∈ P (15)∑
i∈C,q∈P
Mi,q,p ≤ ∆Tp, ∀p ∈ P (16)
V. COALITIONAL GAME
A coalitional game is defined by a pair (N ,Π), where
Π is the mapping cost for suppliers p ∈ N . Π(P,Φ) is
the collection of piq(P,Φ) for every supplier q ∈ N , where
piq(P,Φ) denotes the cost that supplier q needs to pay when
the coalition structure Φ is formed, i.e., q ∈ P,P ∈ Φ.
In order to select a stable coalition structure, we adopt the
coalition formation algorithm in [3]. The algorithm builds
coalitions based on the preferences of the suppliers by allow-
ing only one member to join or leave the coalition at a time,
i.e., the merge-and-split algorithm. Consider two coalitions
(P1,P2) and their respective coalition structure (Φ1,Φ2), where
P1 ∈ N ,P1 ∈ Φ1 and P2 ∈ N ,P2 ∈ Φ2. Supplier p ∈ N
prefers to join the coalition P1 over joining coalition P2
if Λp(P1,Φ1) ≤ Λp(P2,Φ2), where Λp is the preference
function defined as
Λp(P,Φ) =

pip(P,Φ), if piq(P,Φ) ≤ piq(P,Φ \ {q})
∀q ∈ P \ {q} and |P| 6= 1
and P /∈ h(p)
0 otherwise,
where h(p) is a history set of the coalition structures that
supplier p visited, i.e., has formed before. To find the stable
coalition structure, we apply the merge-and-split algorithm as
shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 for finding a stable coalition structure
Input: set N and all the input parameters of package assignment optimization problem
Output: a stable coalition structure, the individual cost for each supplier, the drone
delivery planning includes drone allocation and drone routing
Initialisation : All suppliers are independent (no cooperation among suppliers)
1: first statement
2: while Φ has changed do
3: Φ′ = the list of Φ neighboring coalition structures, which can be found by using
the neighborhood discovery algorithm [3].
4: for every b ∈ Φ′ do
5: for every p ∈ N do
6: Co and Cb are the coalitions that p belongs in coalition structure Φ and
Φ′, respectively.
7: for every P ∈ Φ do
8: V (P) ← MIP (P), ∀P ∈ Φ //solve the package assignment
optimization problem
9: Π(P,Φ)← V (P) //solve the sharing cost
10: end for
11: Do the similar loop as in line 7 to 10 for Φ′.
12: if Λp(Co,Φ) ≥ Λp(Cb,Φ′) then
13: Φ = Φ′; // the coalition structure has changed
14: break; // break to the while loop (line 2)
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: end while
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We present the performance evaluation of the CoDD frame-
work by using two different datasets, i.e., (i) Solomon Bench-
mark suite (C101) [9] and (ii) a real data from a logistic
company in Singapore. We slightly synthesize the data to
suit multiple depots. We implement a GAMS script for the
optimization problem and solve it by CPLEX [10].
We experiment the CoDD framework with the following
parameter setting. Four suppliers are considered. Every sup-
plier has one drone, and all the drones are of the same type
with ld = 150 km, ed = 10 km, fd = 4 kg, hd = 8
hrs, and sd = 30 km/hr. When two suppliers cooperate, they
can use either one or two drones. The numbers of customers
is set equally for all suppliers, where the customers in the
set C1 = {c1, c5, c9, . . . , c|N−3|} belong to the supplier p1,
C2 = {c2, c6, c10, . . . , c|N−2|} belong to the supplier p2,
C3 = {c3, c7, c11, . . . , c|N−1|} belong to the supplier p3, and
C4 = {c4, c8, c12, . . . , c|N |} belong to the supplier p4. The
time of loading a package for a drone is set to be ti = 5
seconds. Moreover, the weight of each package is set to be
ai = 3 kg, and thus the cost of outsourcing package to a carrier
is set accordingly to be C`i = S$16 based on the service by
Singapost company [11]. The cost of transferring packages is
set to be C¨p = S$30 for every supplier. The traveling cost is
set to be C¯i,j = ki,j × 0.105.
A. Solomon Benchmark Suite
We evaluate the CoDD framework with 60 customers as
presented in Figure 2(a). We set the initial cost of drones to
be Ĉd = S$100. The solution is presented in Figure 3, where
all the suppliers cooperate (Φ15). Two drones are used to serve
37 customers. The routing paths are presented in Figure 3. The
solution uses only two drones instead of three drones because
9 out of 13 customers (i.e., 60-37=13) are outside the serving
area, and only four customers are not worth to use one more
drone. As a result, 13 customers are served by the carrier. The
individual cost that each supplier needs to pay can be found
in Table I.
If the suppliers do not cooperate (Φ1), the suppliers need
to pay S$240 for outsourcing 15 packages to the carrier.
The suppliers should not use a drone, since they have few
customers inside their serving area, e.g., the supplier p1 has
only c13 and c17 inside the serving area.
We vary the initial cost of the drones from Ĉd = S$100
to Ĉd = S$0 to study the impact on the supplier cooperation.
Ĉd = S$0 can represent the case when the supplier owns a
drone and does not need to pay any cost for using it. However,
the change from the initial cost does not affect the suppliers
cooperate (Φ15) in this case. The reason is that the numbers
of customers in the serving area of the suppliers are not large
when they do not cooperate. Consequently, the cooperation
between two or three suppliers still gains less benefit than
that of the cooperation of all the suppliers.
Due to the same reason, there is no change to the suppliers’
cooperation when we move the depot of the supplier p1 to the
location which is 20 km north of the original location. The
stable coalition is still Φ15.
B. Real Data from a logistics company in Singapore
We next consider 100 customers from the real Singapore
data with two cases including when the initial cost is Ĉd =
S$100 and Ĉd = S$0. The locations of the depots and cus-
tomers are presented in Figure 2(b). According to the Shapley
value shown in Table I, any supplier that cooperates with
the supplier p3 always achieves lower cost than that without
cooperation. The reason is that the location of the depot of
supplier p3 can cover many customers within the drone flying
range. Additionally, supplier p3 achieves a negative cost in
many coalition structures. The negative cost means that the
supplier gains a positive revenue from the cooperation. This
situation can happen, for example, when other suppliers use
the drone or the depot of this supplier frequently, and thus
have to share the cost by paying to the supplier. On the other
hand, the location of the depot of supplier p1 can cover few
customers. As a result, when the initial cost is high, i.e.,
Ĉd = S$100, supplier p1 does not use a drone. The supplier
p1 outsources all packages to the carrier.
According to Table I, when the initial cost is high, i.e.,
Ĉd = S$100, the solution is that all suppliers cooperate,
i.e., Φ15. The reason is that Φ15 gives the lowest cost for
every supplier. When there is not initial cost, i.e., Ĉd = S$0,
the suppliers p1, p3, and p4 cooperate, i.e., Φ13, without the
supplier p2. This is due to the fact that suppliers p1 and p3
will always want to cooperate as they achieve very low cost
(Φ3), and three suppliers cooperate will further reduce the cost
comparing to the cooperation of the two suppliers. Therefore,
suppliers p1 and p3 allow one more supplier to join in. Note
that the algorithm chooses supplier p4 to join before supplier
p2. However, after suppliers p1, p3, and p4 are in the coalition,
supplier p3 does not allow supplier p2 to join the coalition.
Supplier p3 will suffer from the higher cost if p2 joins the
coalition because (i) the number of customers in the serving
area of pool Φ13 is large enough and (ii) the overlapping
serving area of p2 and p3 decreases the resource utilization of
p3. In summary, when the number of customers in the serving
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TABLE I: Shapley value
Solomon Benchmark Real Data from a logistics company
Initial cost Ĉd = S$100 Initial cost Ĉd = S$100 Initial cost Ĉd = S$0
Coalition Structure p1 p2 p3 p4 p1 p2 p3 p4 p1 p2 p3 p4
Φ1= {{p1},{p2},{p3},{p4}} 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 400.00 317.94 129.33 333.16 369.41 217.94 29.33 233.16
Φ2= {{p1,p2},{p3},{p4}} 205.84 205.84 240.00 240.00 367.36 285.31 129.33 333.16 302.07 150.60 29.33 233.16
Φ3= {{p1,p3},{p2},{p4}} 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 286.07 317.94 15.40 333.16 220.96 217.94 -119.12 233.16
Φ4= {{p1,p4},{p3},{p3}} 190.51 240.00 240.00 190.51 369.06 317.94 129.33 302.22 315.81 217.94 29.33 179.56
Φ5= {{p2,p3},{p1},{p4}} 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 400.00 245.21 56.60 333.16 369.41 145.33 -43.28 233.16
Φ6= {{p2,p4},{p1},{p3}} 240.00 198.50 240.00 198.50 400.00 241.87 129.33 257.09 369.41 133.80 29.33 149.02
Φ7= {{p3,p4},{p1},{p2}} 240.00 240.00 167.78 167.78 400.00 317.94 56.75 260.58 369.41 217.94 -43.23 160.60
Φ8= {{p1,p2},{p3,p4}} 205.84 205.84 167.78 167.78 367.36 285.31 56.75 260.58 302.07 150.60 -43.23 160.60
Φ9= {{p1,p3},{p2,p4}} 240.00 198.50 240.00 198.50 286.07 241.87 15.40 257.09 220.96 133.80 -119.12 179.56
Φ10= {{p1,p4},{p2,p3}} 190.51 240.00 240.00 190.51 369.06 245.21 56.60 302.22 315.81 145.33 -43.28 179.56
Φ11= {{p1,p2,p3},{p4}} 176.40 176.40 210.55 240.00 214.97 181.82 46.86 333.16 187.93 112.30 -157.42 233.16
Φ12= {{p1,p2,p4},{p3}} 180.32 188.31 240.00 172.98 320.53 193.35 129.33 210.26 248.02 66.01 29.33 94.97
Φ13= {{p1,p3,p4},{p2}} 185.42 240.00 162.69 113.20 260.54 317.94 -51.77 235.05 188.15 217.94 -170.89 127.79
Φ14= {{p2,p3,p4},{p1}} 240.00 192.87 162.16 120.66 400.00 206.38 21.25 221.75 369.41 107.17 -69.86 122.44
Φ∗15 = {{p1,p2,p3,p4}} 156.31 163.79 138.17 100.57 231.97 177.81 -67.31 188.62 162.84 81.86 -155.03 97.35
area is large enough, the initial cost of drones and the locations
of depots can affect the stable coalition structure.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The supplier cooperation in drone delivery (CoDD) frame-
work has been proposed to help suppliers decide whether to
cooperate with other suppliers or not. We have proposed the
optimization to address the trade-off between drone delivery
and outsourcing packages to a carrier. We have adopted the
merge-and-split algorithm and Shapley value to decide how
suppliers should cooperate and share the cost incurred from
the delivery and cooperation. Moreover, we have performed
the evaluation of the framework by using data from Solomon
Benchmark suite and Singapore real data. The experiment
shows that if the number of customers in the serving area is
small, then outsourcing packages to a carrier is cheaper than
drone delivery. When the number of customers in the serving
area is large, the initial cost of drones and the locations of
depots have an impact to the stable coalition structure. For
the future direction, the uncertainty in drone delivery and the
uncertainty in supplier behaviors will be considered.
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